沪江小Q / 全部问题 / 能力英语 / 互助翻译
More specifically, regarding financing strategies, suppose the wait-and-see strategy gives an instantaneous probability of δ > 0 (constant hazard rate) for finding one investor.7 The bargaining process is such that VC makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur's expected bargaining power is denoted by ρ1(T) and her probability of finding an investor by w(T). This limited bargaining power stems from the fact that VCs are ex post differentiated (although symmetric as long as no match is found).
As for the just-do-it strategy, suppose this strategy gives a constant hazard rate of Δ > 0 if the amount k is invested at t = 0 and this amount is then sunk. In this case, the entrepreneur's bargaining power and the probability of achieving the intermediate milestone is denoted by ρ2 and p(T), respectively. Given the assumptions made, ρ2 = 1 and p(T) = ΔT. Let us only consider cases for which p(T) < 1, given that the E starts the project with limited resources. This can also be motivated by the fact that the entrepreneur still needs to spend some time and effort in raising funds, while at the same time working on her project. We further assume that relative to the previous strategy, the entrepreneur needs to exert more effort under the just-do-it strategy. Effort cost is denoted by c > 0, while for S1 it is normalized to zero.8 Table 1 presents an overview of all the variables used throughout the article.
As for the just-do-it strategy, suppose this strategy gives a constant hazard rate of Δ > 0 if the amount k is invested at t = 0 and this amount is then sunk. In this case, the entrepreneur's bargaining power and the probability of achieving the intermediate milestone is denoted by ρ2 and p(T), respectively. Given the assumptions made, ρ2 = 1 and p(T) = ΔT. Let us only consider cases for which p(T) < 1, given that the E starts the project with limited resources. This can also be motivated by the fact that the entrepreneur still needs to spend some time and effort in raising funds, while at the same time working on her project. We further assume that relative to the previous strategy, the entrepreneur needs to exert more effort under the just-do-it strategy. Effort cost is denoted by c > 0, while for S1 it is normalized to zero.8 Table 1 presents an overview of all the variables used throughout the article.
最佳答案
更具体地说，就融资策略，假设观望策略，给出了一个瞬时的概率δ > 0 （常数危险率）为寻找一investor.7讨价还价的过程是这样的VC作出了接管它-或-离开-它提供的企业家。企业家的预期的议价能力，是指由ρ1 （ t ）和她的概率找到一个投资者，由瓦特（吨） 。这有限的议价能力，源于事实，即风险投资是事后有区别的（虽然对称，只要没有找到匹配） 。
至于刚刚做-资讯科技策略，假设这一战略提供了不断的危险率δ > 0 ，如果数额k是投资在t = 0和然后这笔款项沉没。在这种情况下，企业家的议价能力和概率实现中间的里程碑，是指由ρ2和P （吨） ，分别。鉴于所作出的假设， ρ2 = 1和P （吨） = δ汤匙让我们只考虑个案，其中p （ t ）的<一，鉴于电子商务启动该项目与有限的资源。这也可以动机的事实是，企业家还需要花一些时间和精力，在筹集资金，而在同一时间内对她的工作项目。我们进一步假设，相对以往的战略，企业家的需要，施加更大的努力下，刚刚做的-资讯科技策略。努力成本是指用C > 0 ，而S1的，这是正常化，以zero.8表1概述了所有变量用于整个文章。
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至于刚刚做-资讯科技策略，假设这一战略提供了不断的危险率δ > 0 ，如果数额k是投资在t = 0和然后这笔款项沉没。在这种情况下，企业家的议价能力和概率实现中间的里程碑，是指由ρ2和P （吨） ，分别。鉴于所作出的假设， ρ2 = 1和P （吨） = δ汤匙让我们只考虑个案，其中p （ t ）的<一，鉴于电子商务启动该项目与有限的资源。这也可以动机的事实是，企业家还需要花一些时间和精力，在筹集资金，而在同一时间内对她的工作项目。我们进一步假设，相对以往的战略，企业家的需要，施加更大的努力下，刚刚做的-资讯科技策略。努力成本是指用C > 0 ，而S1的，这是正常化，以zero.8表1概述了所有变量用于整个文章。
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2008/5/20 21:50:05
回答者：kk75
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