[已解决问题] 金融英语```英翻中```
4.3. Choice of financing strategy
The entrepreneur has two alternative strategies she can adopt:
1. The wait-and-see strategy (S1): The E can wait and see if she can find an interested venture capitalist before spending much time and effort on the project. If she cannot find a venture capitalist before time T, the project is no longer of any value to her. However, if she finds a venture capitalist, her bargaining power is a function of the time remaining before the option is lost (the idea is that an entrepreneur who is time-constrained has less bargaining power than one who can wait another year or so before starting the project—the latter can then look around for additional investors in order to increase her bargaining power).
2. The just-do-it strategy (S2): she can invest the amount k now in order to start the project, knowing that this is not enough to complete it. However, it allows the entrepreneur to accomplish (with some probability) a milestone that will make the project worthwhile for large outside investors. If successful, VCs will compete for the project (since now they all find the project sufficiently large) so that the entrepreneur will have all the bargaining power vis-a-vis venture capitalists).
For simplicity, both strategies are assumed to be mutually exclusive, and the entrepreneur only needs to inject the amount k into the firm if she chooses S2.5 Moreover, once the E has chosen a strategy, she can no longer change it. Under S2, the liquidation value is 0 if the E has not raised the remaining amount of money required before time T. Another simplifying assumption is that all venture capitalists in the market have enough funds to finance any other valuable project they can find, so that there is no competition among entrepreneurs for venture capital funding once a match is made. We also assume that both strategies are profitable for the E at time t = 0. The VC participation constraint must also be satisfied, which we assume to be the case even at time 0 (to avoid an additional constraint). Lastly, as in Myers (2000) and many other studies, we assume that the financing strategy of the E at time t = 0 is a non-contractible variable (and thus also the investment k). If both parties were able to contract on it, the first-best outcome would always be achieved. This assumption is irrelevant in the basic setting (Section 5), but is important in Section 6. This implies that the costs k are at the discretion of the entrepreneur (e.g., she may be able to decide on the company's “burn rate”) and hence a BA cannot force the E to undertake S2 (however, he can, of course, force S1 by delaying the supply of capital k to the entrepreneur).6
The entrepreneur has two alternative strategies she can adopt:
1. The wait-and-see strategy (S1): The E can wait and see if she can find an interested venture capitalist before spending much time and effort on the project. If she cannot find a venture capitalist before time T, the project is no longer of any value to her. However, if she finds a venture capitalist, her bargaining power is a function of the time remaining before the option is lost (the idea is that an entrepreneur who is time-constrained has less bargaining power than one who can wait another year or so before starting the project—the latter can then look around for additional investors in order to increase her bargaining power).
2. The just-do-it strategy (S2): she can invest the amount k now in order to start the project, knowing that this is not enough to complete it. However, it allows the entrepreneur to accomplish (with some probability) a milestone that will make the project worthwhile for large outside investors. If successful, VCs will compete for the project (since now they all find the project sufficiently large) so that the entrepreneur will have all the bargaining power vis-a-vis venture capitalists).
For simplicity, both strategies are assumed to be mutually exclusive, and the entrepreneur only needs to inject the amount k into the firm if she chooses S2.5 Moreover, once the E has chosen a strategy, she can no longer change it. Under S2, the liquidation value is 0 if the E has not raised the remaining amount of money required before time T. Another simplifying assumption is that all venture capitalists in the market have enough funds to finance any other valuable project they can find, so that there is no competition among entrepreneurs for venture capital funding once a match is made. We also assume that both strategies are profitable for the E at time t = 0. The VC participation constraint must also be satisfied, which we assume to be the case even at time 0 (to avoid an additional constraint). Lastly, as in Myers (2000) and many other studies, we assume that the financing strategy of the E at time t = 0 is a non-contractible variable (and thus also the investment k). If both parties were able to contract on it, the first-best outcome would always be achieved. This assumption is irrelevant in the basic setting (Section 5), but is important in Section 6. This implies that the costs k are at the discretion of the entrepreneur (e.g., she may be able to decide on the company's “burn rate”) and hence a BA cannot force the E to undertake S2 (however, he can, of course, force S1 by delaying the supply of capital k to the entrepreneur).6
最佳答案
4.3 。选择融资策略
企业家有两个替代战略，她可以采取：
1 。该观望策略（一） ：电子商务可以拭目以待，如果她能找到一个有兴趣的风险资本家，然后才动用很多时间和精力上项目。如果她不能找到一个风险资本家之前，时间t ，该项目已不再是任何价值的她。不过，如果她认定，风险资本家，她的议价能力，是一个功能前的剩余时间内的选择是失去了（的想法是，一位企业家，谁是时间约束的少，议价能力比1谁可以再等一年或前启动项目，后者可以，然后环顾四周，为更多的投资者，以增加她的议价能力） 。
2 。刚刚做的-资讯科技策略（二） ：她可以投资的金额k现在，为了启动项目，知道这是不足够的完成。但是，它可以让企业家来完成（在某些概率）的一个里程碑，这将使该项目值得大外来投资者。如果成功的话，风险投资，将竞争该项目的（因为现在他们都找到足够大的项目） ，使该企业家将所有的议价能力相对于风险资本家） 。
为简单起见，双方的战略假设为相互排斥的，企业家只需要注资的金额k到该公司，如果她选择s2.5此外，一旦电子选择了策略，她再也不能改变它。根据S2的，清算价值是零，如果电子没有提出，其余的款项之前，需要时间t的另一个简化的假设是，所有风险资本家在市场上有足够的资金来资助任何其他有价值的项目，他们可以找到，使有没有之间的竞争，企业家的创业资金，一旦匹配。我们还以为这两个战略有利可图，电子商务在时间t = 0 。该VC的参与约束，还必须感到满意，这是我们必须承担的情况，即使在时间0 （以避免额外的约束） 。最后，由于在迈尔斯（ 2000年）和许多其他研究，我们假设认为，融资策略的电子在时间t = 0是一个非收缩变（因此也投资k ）段。如果双方当事人都能够合约上，第一最好的结果将始终能够实现。这个假设是不相干的，在基本设置（第5条） ，但重要的是在第6条。这意味着成本K为在谨慎的创业者（例如，她可能能够决定该公司的“烧伤率” ） ，因此，广管局不能强迫电子商务进行S2的（不过，他当然可以，部队中一延迟资本供应K至企业家） 0.6
提问者对于答案的评价：似乎是用在线翻```还是谢谢拉`
企业家有两个替代战略，她可以采取：
1 。该观望策略（一） ：电子商务可以拭目以待，如果她能找到一个有兴趣的风险资本家，然后才动用很多时间和精力上项目。如果她不能找到一个风险资本家之前，时间t ，该项目已不再是任何价值的她。不过，如果她认定，风险资本家，她的议价能力，是一个功能前的剩余时间内的选择是失去了（的想法是，一位企业家，谁是时间约束的少，议价能力比1谁可以再等一年或前启动项目，后者可以，然后环顾四周，为更多的投资者，以增加她的议价能力） 。
2 。刚刚做的-资讯科技策略（二） ：她可以投资的金额k现在，为了启动项目，知道这是不足够的完成。但是，它可以让企业家来完成（在某些概率）的一个里程碑，这将使该项目值得大外来投资者。如果成功的话，风险投资，将竞争该项目的（因为现在他们都找到足够大的项目） ，使该企业家将所有的议价能力相对于风险资本家） 。
为简单起见，双方的战略假设为相互排斥的，企业家只需要注资的金额k到该公司，如果她选择s2.5此外，一旦电子选择了策略，她再也不能改变它。根据S2的，清算价值是零，如果电子没有提出，其余的款项之前，需要时间t的另一个简化的假设是，所有风险资本家在市场上有足够的资金来资助任何其他有价值的项目，他们可以找到，使有没有之间的竞争，企业家的创业资金，一旦匹配。我们还以为这两个战略有利可图，电子商务在时间t = 0 。该VC的参与约束，还必须感到满意，这是我们必须承担的情况，即使在时间0 （以避免额外的约束） 。最后，由于在迈尔斯（ 2000年）和许多其他研究，我们假设认为，融资策略的电子在时间t = 0是一个非收缩变（因此也投资k ）段。如果双方当事人都能够合约上，第一最好的结果将始终能够实现。这个假设是不相干的，在基本设置（第5条） ，但重要的是在第6条。这意味着成本K为在谨慎的创业者（例如，她可能能够决定该公司的“烧伤率” ） ，因此，广管局不能强迫电子商务进行S2的（不过，他当然可以，部队中一延迟资本供应K至企业家） 0.6
2008-5-20 21:52:30
回答者：kk75
提问者对于答案的评价：似乎是用在线翻```还是谢谢拉`
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